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FRAGMENTING WORK AND
FRAGMENTING ORGANIZATIONS:
THE CONTRACT OF EMPLOYMENT
AND THE SCOPE OF LABOUR
REGULATION©
JUDY FUDGE*
This article diagnoses the conceptual and normative
crisis of the scope of labour protection as resulting
from the conception of employment as a personal and
bilateral contract between an employee and a unitary
employer that is characterized by the employee's
subordination. It argues that the related fragmentation
of organizations and fragmentation of work reveals the
extent of the problem with this legal conceptualization
of employment. The article offers an approach to
reconceptualizing the scope of labour protection that is
based on an understanding of personal work
arrangements and enterprises as activities. It justifies
this approach in terms of the goals of labour
regulation-responding to market failure, protecting
human rights, strengthening social solidarity, and
promoting countervailing power.
Cet article pose un diagnostic de la crise conceptuelle
et normative de l'6tendue de la protection de la main
d'oeuvre, en affirmant qu'elle d~coule du fait de
concevoir l'emploi comme un contrat personnel et
bilateral entre un employ6 et un employeur unitaire,
contrat qui se caract~rise par la subordination de
l'employ6. L'article avance que la fragmentation
connexe des organisations, et la fragmentation du
travail, r6velent l'ampleur du probl~me que pose cette
conceptualisation juridique de l'emploi. L'article offre
une mfthode permettant de reconceptualiser l'tendue
de la protection de la main d'oeuvre, fond~e sur le fait
de percevoir les am~nagements relatifs au travail
personnel et les entreprises comme des activit~s.
L'article justifie cette m~thode sur le plan des buts de
a r~glementation du travail-repondre A la d~faillance
du march6, prot~ger les droits de la personne,
renforcer la solidarit6 sociale, et promouvoir le
pouvoir compensateur.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The changes in employment relations and organizations since
the 1980s have led to what is widely recognized as a conceptual crisis in
the broad area of employment and labour law.1 Policies promoting the
deregulation of labour markets have combined with new technologies to
transform the standard employment relationship that was established in
the period of reconstruction following World War II. The growth of
flexible forms of work, emphasis on entrepreneurship, widespread
vertical disintegration, and the rise of network enterprises have.
undermined the legal concepts of the "employee" and "employer"-
concepts that have traditionally been used to determine the scope of
labour protection and of social insurance. Increasingly, the contract of
employment is being challenged as the best method for determining the
boundary between the discrete realms of labour protection and
commercial transaction.2
This conceptual crisis has a long legacy, but it was only in the
mid-1990s that it began to attract a great deal of attention, generating a
plethora of scholarly articles, studies, and recommendations over the
Paul Davies & Mark Freedland, "Changing Perspectives on the Employment
Relationship in British Labour Law" in Catherine Barnard, Simon Deakin & Gillian S. Morris, eds.,
The Future of Labour Law LiberAmicorum Sir Bob Hepple OC(Portland: Hart, 2004) 129 at 156-
58.
2 Bob Hepple, "Restructuring Employment Rights" (1986) 15 Indus. L.J. 69; Sandra
Fredman, "Women at Work: The Broken Promise of Flexicurity" (2004) 33 Indus. L.J. 299.
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next decade. Most of this work has focused on the distinction that
determines the scope of labour law: the distinction between
employment, which is understood as subordinated or dependent labour,
and independent contracting, which is equated with entrepreneurship
and freedom of contract. However, the crisis is much broader, and it
occurs on two fronts: identifying employees and identifying their
employer. This second problem, which involves attributing responsibility
for the costs and risks of utilizing labour, has received much less
attention-with the exception of triangular relationships involving
temporary agencies that supply only labour to enterprises-within the
Anglo-Saxon, common law world.
While these problems were always latent in the field of
employment and labour law, their resolution has recently become much
more critical given the changes in the way services and production are
organized, and the way labour is contracted and deployed. This problem
will not be solved either by devising better tests to distinguish between
subordinated labour and independent contracting, or by developing the
concept of dependent contractor or worker. Nor will the problem of
defining the scope of employment protection be solved by developing
better tests to identify which entity is the "real" employer in situations
where multiple parties are involved. New tests cannot solve the problem
because it is much deeper; it has to do with conceptualizing employment
as a personal and bilateral contract between two unitary and bounded
entities.
To substantiate this claim, I will draw on a series of articles and
reports I have written (either singly or with co-authors) that have
examined the scope of employment from the supply and demand sides.
My goal is to draw together the strands of this research in order to
develop a different approach to determining the scope of labour
protection. This article is conceptual and normative, and proceeds in
three parts. The first part briefly looks at the processes that have led to
the fragmentation of work, and its purpose is to link the two sides of the
problem-the fragmentation of employment and the vertical
disintegration of employing enterprises-by focussing on the changing
organizational form of enterprises. The second part focuses on the
conventional legal framework that is used to conceptualize the
employment relationship: a bilateral contract of personal service
characterized either by subordination or by dependence. First, I
examine the problem of distinguishing employees from independent
contractors, and I then turn to the related problem of identifying the
2006]
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employer for the purposes of labour protection. The third part
addresses the question of how to resolve the problem of determining the
scope of employment. I begin by identifying the goals of or reasons for
regulating work arrangements, and then look at some general
approaches to addressing the supply and demand sides of the
determination of the scope of labour protection. In the penultimate
part, I develop a matrix for ascribing employment-related
responsibilities in complex, multilateral work arrangements. To
conclude, I address the legitimacy of expanding labour law beyond the
contract of employment.
II. CHANGING ORGANIZATIONS AND FRAGMENTING
WORK
The standard employment relationship is conceptualized as
involving a bounded relationship: a contract between a single employer
and an employee. However, changing organizational forms have
reshaped this conception. Groundbreaking work by Hugh Collins on the
vertical disintegration of firms and the breakdown of internal labour
markets has shown how individuals who had once been treated as
employees could easily be transformed into independent contractors
who are outside the scope of labour protection.3 In a companion article,
Collins also raised what he called the "capital boundary problem."'4 He
identified a growing reliance on relational contracting and cooperation
between firms at the expense of organizing activities within firms, and
noted that many of these complex economic enterprises function as
quasi-firms. According to Collins,. the problem is that "where the work is
organised through numerous separate legal entities rather than a single
firm, the limits of legal responsibility set by reference to the boundaries
of capital units establish the conditions for potential injustice."5 This is
because the firm is free to organize its activities as it sees fit, either
through vertical integration within one corporate entity or via external
contracting, and can adopt a form that enables it to avoid or minimize
'Hugh Collins, "Independent Contractors and the Challenge of Vertical Disintegration to
Employment Protection Laws" (1990) 10 Oxford J. Legal Stud. 353.
' Hugh Collins, "Ascription of Legal Responsibility to Groups in Common Patterns of
Economic Integration" (1990) 53 Mod. L. Rev. 731.
5 Ibid. at 736.
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its exposure to judgment for statutory employment-related obligations
such as pay equity, health and safety, and severance pay.
Paul Davies, Simon Deakin, and Mark Freedland have taken up
this approach of looking at both sides of the employment relationship.6
Although initially their work dealt with the question of how to identify
those workers in need of employment protection, they, like Collins,
turned to the question of ascribing responsibility for employment-
related costs, duties, and risks in multilateral employment relationships
where more than one employing entity was involved. Recently, together
with Davies and alone, Freedland has begun to look at the relationship
between the two aspects of the problem of determining the scope of
employment, which he sees as springing from a single source: the
conception of the employment relationship as a personal and bilateral
contract, which also involves conceiving of the employer as a unitary
entity.
In a recent essay, Davies and Freedland draw upon work by
Linda Dickens that makes the connection between the growth of flexible
and atypical forms of employment and the rise of "networked,
boundaryless (sometimes virtual) organisations."' Although Dickens
makes the distinction between these two trends in order to contrast the
profound differences in the quality of different types of non-standard
work, Davies and Freedland use her "dual categorization of change in
the nature of employment" to develop a "more ambitious cross-cutting
theme, which is the growing multi-agency organization of personal work
relations."8 It is this insight that I want to develop, and I will do so by
drawing upon an edited collection called Fragmenting Work. Blurring
Organizational Boundaries and Disordering Hierarchies.9
In this collection, Damian Grimshaw, Mick Marchington, Jill
Rubery, and Hugh Wilmott argue for the need to go beyond "this
6Simon Deakin, "The Changing Concept of 'Employer' in Labour Law" (2001) 30 Indust.
L.J. 72; Simon Deakin, "'Enterprise Risk': The Juridical Nature of the Firm Revisited" (2003) 32
Indust. L. J. 97; and Davies & Freedland, in Barnard, Deakin & Morris, supra note 1.
'Paul Davies & Mark Freedland, "The Complexities of the Employing Enterprise" in Guy
Davidov & Brian Langille, eds., Boundaries and Frontiers of Labour Law (Portland: Hart, 2006)
273 [Davis & Freedland, "Complexities"]; Linda Dickens, "Problems of Fit: Changing Employment
and Labour Regulation" (2004) 42 Brit. J. Ind. Rel. 595.
8Davis & Freedland, "Complexities," ibid. at 286.
' Mick Marchington et al., eds., Fragmenting Worte Blurring Organizational Boundaries
andDisordering Hierarchies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).
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polarization of the 'employment' and 'organization' dimensions of
work" in order to provide an integrated analysis that appreciates the
interaction of the two dimensions.10 They note the importance of
remembering "that the boundaries of an 'organization' are in many
respects defined by the extent of the internalized employment
relationship."" The main theoretical argument they make is for "an
expanded and more complex matrix of inter-organizational relations
that re-inserts the employment relationship into the study of
organizations.""2 Focussing on the relationship between changing
organizational forms and changing employment relations allows them to
capture the twin dimensiois of flexibility or, in other words, the supply
and demand sides of the employment relationship. They present the
significance of organizational form for the employment relationship
diagrammatically, which I have adapted by using terminology that is
more familiar in Canada.
10 Damian Grimshaw et a., "Introduction: Fragmenting Work Across Organizational
Boundaries," in Mick Marchington etal., ibid. at 10.
" Ibid. In fact, this is precisely what Ronald Coase does in his theory of the firm. See Judy
Fudge, "La segmentation verticale et l'externalisation de l'emploi: Le Droit commun, la
corporation, et Coase" (2006) Bulletin de droit compare du travail et de la s6curit6 sociale 85.
12 Ibid. at 16.
614 [VOL. 44, NO. 4
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Figure 1
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The x-axis depicts the variations in internal labour markets and
the standard employment contract. The y-axis represents the extent to
which the employment contract is under the influence of a single
employing organization or is subject to control or influence by multiple
employing entities. The standard employment contract that is typical of
the large firm with an internal labour market is situated where the two
axes meet. Self-employment is the farthest away from that point-
diagonally across from it-since it is regarded as the opposite of
employment. Most research has focused on where to draw the line
between employees and non-employees along the x-axis, and the
concern is with flexible forms of employment, such as part-time, casual,
temporary, and dependent workers. However, as Grimshaw et a. note,
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although there has been much less attention to this dimension,
variations in employment relationships also occur along the y-axis.
Although employment is treated as a bounded relationship
between an employee and an employer, which is identified as a single
firm, the boundaries of the firm have proven to be quite porous,
"making it difficult to know where the firm ends and where the market
or another firm begins."' 3 There has been a growing reliance on
relational contracting and cooperation between firms at the expense of
organizing activities within firms. Many of these complex economic
organizations function as quasi-firms. Emerging organizational forms,
such as networks, have combined with older, pre-Fordist organizational
forms-especially subcontracting and employment agencies-to blur the
traditional boundary of the firm. Grimshaw et a]. suggest that "it is more
plausible to regard 'market', 'hierarchy', and 'network' as concepts that
have proven valuable in differentiating elements or dimensions of
organizing practices within and between organizations, rather than as
alternative designs of economic organization."' 4
The fragmentation of the enterprise as an organization and the
decline of hierarchy in the organization of internal labour markets have
led to more complex employment relationships that do not fit with the
conception of employment as a bilateral and personal contract.15 There
are a wide range of situations involving, for example, employment
agencies, franchising, subcontracting, and labour-only contracting, in
which the different functions involved in employing labour have been
distributed among a number of different entities. Interconnected
corporate groups rival the vertically integrated firm as a method of
organizing services and production, and integrated chains of production
and distribution have long been the preferred method of organizing
enterprises in certain sectors. Joint ventures, partnerships, and
situations involving the purchase and operation of an enterprise by a
separate legal entity also complicate the organizational landscape.
3 Walter W. Powell, "The Capitalist Firm in the Twenty-First Century: Emerging Patterns
in Western Enterprise" in Paul DiMaggio, ed., The Twent First- Century Firr. Changing
Economic Organization in International Perspective (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003)
at 58.
14 Grimshaw et al., "Introduction" in Marchington et al., supra note 9, 1 at 16.
' Judy Fudge, "The Legal Boundaries of the Employer, Precarious Workers, and Labour
Protection" in Davidov & Langille, supra note 7, 295 [Fudge, "The Legal Boundaries"].
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The changes in how enterprises are organized have resulted in a
transformation in, and polarization of, employment relations. At the
high end of the spectrum are the knowledge workers, who are associated
with the rise of the "new economy" and networked organizations.
16
These workers function as entrepreneurs in the boundary-less
enterprise, building their own networks, which-when linked with their
property in knowledge-can invert the relations of power and
subordination that have traditionally structured employment. Although
they fall outside the standard employment relationship, these workers
are not typically considered to be in need of labour protection. 7
At the other end of the spectrum are "precarious" or vulnerable
workers who are associated with the informal economy and
subcontracted labour. 8 These workers are poorly paid and employed in
atypical and unstable jobs, which more often than not fall outside the
scope of collective representation or legal regulation. Initially identified
with household labour in small, family enterprises in developing
countries, informal employment has grown across the world as firms
pursue flexible forms of labour, such as casual labour, contract labour,
outsourcing, home-working, and other forms of subcontracting that
offer the prospect of minimizing fixed non-wage costs.
The structure of enterprises determines not only what form the
employment relationship takes, but also which entity in a common
enterprise bears the responsibility for employing labour and the
attendant employment-related obligations. The blurring of
organizational boundaries affects whether a worker falls within the
scope of labour protection and which entity bears the responsibility for
legal obligations owed to employees in different legal contexts.
/6 Dickens, supra note 7; Katherine V.W. Stone, From Widgets to Digits Employment
Regulation for the Changing Workplace (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2004); Alan
Hyde, Working in Silicon Valley Economic and Legal Analysis of a Higb- Velocity Labor Market
(Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2003).
" However, in a labour market in which knowledge workers are oversupplied, they too are
easily transformed into contingent workers who may well be in need of labour protections. See John
Purcell, Kate Purcell & Stephanie Tailby, "Temporary Work Agencies: Here Today, Gone
Tomorrow?" (2004) 42 Brit. J. Ind. Rel. 705.
'Judy Fudge & Rosemary Owens, "Precarious Work, Women and the New Economy: The
Challenge to Legal Norms" in Judy Fudge & Rosemary Owens, eds., Precarious Work, Women and
the New Economy The Challenge to Legal Norms (Oxford: Hart, 2006) 3 at 7-9.
20061
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Moreover, the organizational form that an enterprise takes has a
profound impact upon equity in employment conditions. 9
III. THE SHORTCOMINGS OF THE CONVENTIONAL
LEGAL FRAMEWORK
The law conceptualizes employment as a bilateral personal
contract that is marked by subordination. However, there are two
problems with this conceptualization. First, it assumes that there is a
conceptual and normative salience to the distinction between employees
and independent contractors for the purpose of determining the scope
of employment and labour protection. Second, it anthropomorphizes or
personalizes the employer by assuming that the employer is a unitary
entity.2" These two problems are linked, and combined they create
insurmountable problems for determining the scope of employment.
A. Employees and Independent Contractors: The (In)significance
of Subordination
Historically, in both civil and common law systems, the key to
distinguishing employment contracts from other contracts for the use of
labour was the subordination of the worker.1 However, this emphasis
upon subordination in the common law jurisdictions owes more to
master and servant law than it does to contract. Moreover, the recent
growth in self-employment indicates that subordination is not very
helpful in distinguishing between employment and independent
contracting.
Through most of the nineteenth century, the continued
operation of master and servant statutes in Anglo-Saxon common law
19 Hugh Collins, "Multi-segmented Workforces, Comparative Fairness, and the Capital
Boundary Obstacle" in Davidov & Langille, supra note 7, 317 [Collins, "Multi-segmented
Workforces"]; Jill Earnshaw, Jill Rubery & Fang Lee Cooke, Who is the Employe (London:
Institute of Employment Rights, 2002) at 2.
20 Mark R. Freedland, The Personal Employment Contract (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2003).
21 Simon Deakin, "The Comparative Evolution of the Employment Relationship" in
Davidov & Langille, supra note 7, 89; Adalberto Perulli, Economically dependent / quasi-
subordinate (parasubordinate) employment legal, social and economic aspects (Brussels:
European Commission, 2002), online: <http://ec.europa.eu/employment-social/labourlaw
/docs/parasubordinationreport en.pdf>.
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jurisdictions emphasized the hierarchical and status dimension of
employment, and provided the context for most decision making about
its scope. 22 No clear distinction between employees and independent
contractors emerged, either at common law or, for that matter, within
statutory master and servant regimes. Although the decriminalization of
master and servant law in the last quarter of the nineteenth century and
the growing importance of vicarious liability created a space for the
conceptual triumph of contractualism, and the development of a "pure"
and unambiguous test for distinguishing between employees and
independent contractors, a clear distinction between employees and
independent contractors still did not emerge. Labour markets never
enjoyed a laissez-faire period. By the time master and servant laws were
being repealed, other regulatory legislation was being enacted and
decisions had to be made about the scope of its operation. In England,
for example, Deakin argues that social legislation of the late nineteenth
century continued to rely on status-based distinctions between different
classes of workers.23 It was only in the early twentieth century that the
legislation began to use the concept of the contract of service as a way to
define the class of people covered, and this practice required courts to
distinguish between different types of contracts. To differentiate
between contracts of service and contracts for services, courts adopted
the control test. However, instead of resorting to a well-established
common law test, Deakin claims that judges introduced a doctrinal
innovation that enabled them to restrict the application of social
legislation that they found repugnant. 24 The effect was to exclude low-
status casual and seasonal workers on the one hand and high-status
professionals on the other, thus emphasizing older status-based
distinctions. Deakin argues that a more unitary conception of
employment only became firmly rooted in the National Insurance Act
1946, which established two principal classes of contributors: employees
under a contract of service and persons employed on their own
The historical discussion draws upon Judy Fudge, Eric Tucker & Leah Vosko, The Legal
Concept of Employment. Marginalizing Workers (Report for the Law Commission of Canada,
October 2002) [Fudge, Tucker & Vosko, The Legal Concept]; Judy Fudge, Eric Ticker & Leah
Vosko, "Changing Boundaries in Employment: Developing A New Platform for Labour Law"
(2003) 10 C.L.E.L.J. 329 at 361.
23 Simon Deakin, "The Contract of Employment: A Study in Legal Evolution" (2001) 11
Hist. Stud. Indus. Rel. 1.
24 Ibid.
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account. 5 Under this new scheme, courts found the control test to be
inappropriate and began to develop other approaches, including the
"integration" and "business reality" tests, which emphasize economic as
opposed to personal subordination. These tests were better suited to
employment relationships in the large vertically integrated firms that
grew after World War II, and which funded the social insurance
scheme.26
There was, however, nothing inevitable about the
contractualization of employment. As Deakin explains, the employment
contract was constructed in response to a set of contingent economic
and social circumstances that combined in the period of reconstruction
after World War II. These circumstances-the rise of the welfare state,
the growth of industrial-based unions, and the proliferation of large
vertically integrated firms-began to unravel in the 1980s, "thereby
endangering the very project of democratic emancipation that it
introduced."27
Since the 1980s, there has been a partial renaissance in self-
employment. However, rather than unconditionally celebrating it as
evidence of the vitality of entrepreneurship, the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development raised concerns about the
quality (working conditions, training, security, and income) and status
(whether it was a form of disguised employment) of much of the new
self-employment. 8 These concerns were particularly relevant to Canada,
where there was a large growth in self-employment through the 1980s
and 1990s. By 2002 self-employment reached 16 per cent of all
employment.2
9
Simon Deakin, "The Evolution of the Contract of Employment, 1900-1950: The
Influence of the Welfare State" in Neal Whiteside & Robert Salais, eds., Governance, Industry and
Labour Markets in Britain and France: The Modernising State in the Mid-Twentieth century
(London: Routledge, 1998) 212 at 214-15.
' Simon Deakin & Frank Wilkinson, The Law of the Labour Market. Industrialization,
Employment, and Legal Evolution (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005) at 95.
2 Simon Deakin, "The Evolution of the Employment Relationship" in Peter Auer &
Bernard Gazier, eds., The Future of Work, Employment and Social Protectiorr The Dynamics of
Change and the Protecti~n of Workers: Proceedings of the France/ILO Symposium, Lyon 2002
(London: International Institute for Labour Studies, 2002) 191 at 195-66.
28 OECD, "Partial Renaissance of Self-Employment," OECD Employment Outlook (Paris:
OECD, 2000) at 187.
29 This discussion of the data is drawn from Fudge, Tucker & Vosko, The Legal Concept,
supra note 22; Judy Fudge, "Labour Protection for Self-Employed Workers" (2003) 3 Just Labour
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The self-employed do not make up a homogenous category; they
range from the high-income professional who employs others to the
child-care provider who works out of her home and employs no one.
Sociologists now recognize a continuum of self-employment that differs
in terms of the quality of and rewards from the work, and the chances of
economic security and success. The range of self-employed covers
employees who are falsely labelled as self-employed, franchisees, skilled
crafts people, independent professionals, and owners of incorporated
businesses who employ many workers. At best, some types of self-
employment provide autonomy which allows people to realize their
potential and align rewards with efforts; at worst, self-employed workers
are marginalized and fall outside the scope of labour protection and
social insurance.
One crucial distinction among the self-employed turns on
whether they hire other employees. Self-employed people can be
employers, who employ other workers, or they can be own-account,
which means that they do not hire anyone else. In 2000, 65.4 per cent of
the self-employed were own-account, and it is in this type of self-
employment that women and members of visible minorities are more
likely to be found. The two categories of employment exhibit profound
differences in income: on average, self-employed employers earned two
and a half times more than the own-account self-employed did in 1999.
The own-account self-employed also earn less on average than
employees do. Generally, the self-employed are less likely to have access
to benefits than employees, although access to benefits depends upon
the type of self-employment, with self-employed employers enjoying
greater coverage than the own-account self-employed. Moreover, in
2000, 30 per cent of the own-account self-employed worked in client
locations or locations supplied by clients, and 37 per cent of all of the
self-employed received support from their clients. In 2000, 15 per cent
of the total number of self-employed (18 per cent of own account self-
employed) reported that their last employer was one of their clients, of
whom 51 per cent obtained more than half of their annual revenue from
work done for their last employer. The day-to-day business operations
of many self-employed mirror those of many employees.
36; Cynthia Cranford et al, Self-Employed Workers Organi. . Law, Policy, and Unions (Montreal:
McGill-Queens University Press, 2005) at 8-12.
2006]
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As employment relationships have changed with the growth of
market-mediated work arrangements and networks of firms, the simple
dichotomy between subordination and autonomy is not an effective way
of determining entitlement to labour protection under the law.
Moreover, once we turn to the demand side of the employment
relationship, it is evident that relying on subordination and autonomy to
determine the boundary of employment protection is conceptually
flawed.
B. Beyond a Unitary Analysis of the Employer
In their examination of employment relationships that involve
multiple employers, Jill Rubery, Jill Earnshaw, and Mick Marchington
remark that a "scrutiny of the legal framework [in the U.K.] surrounding
the employment relationship and of relevant case law demonstrates that
the traditional focus on regulation within the confines of a single
organization remains largely untouched., 30 They also question whether
an organizational entity can make a psychological contract with an
employee because, as they note, "[a]n organization is neither a person
nor a social entity (as opposed to a legal entity as party to the legal
employment contract) and should not be anthropomorphized or indeed
reified as a coherent, unified agent."31 Nevertheless, as Freedland
explains, employment law does precisely this; it treats the complex
organization that in most cases is the employer as if it were the same as
the human master.
The source of this conceptual confusion is, once again, master
and servant law. According to Freedland, employment's master and
servant roots shape its characterization as a personal and bilateral
contract. While this characterization fits with situations where a human
employer personally directs an employee, it bears little resemblance to
situations where the employee is employed in a large bureaucratic
network, subject to many sources of direction and authority, and where
the employee's contract is with a corporation instead of a human being.
This conceptual framework has remained intact, despite the change in
0 Jill Rubery, Jill Earnshaw & Mick Marchington, "Blurring the Boundaries to the
Employment Relationship: From Single to Multi-employer Relationships" in Marchington et al.,
supra note 9 at 73 [Rubery, Earnshaw & Marchington, "Blurring the Boundaries"].
31 Ibid. at 77-78.
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employment relations and enterprises, because "the legal corporate
person, the incorporated company," has been treated "as the direct
equivalent of the individual human employer or master. 3 2 The complex
multilateral relationship between people within a work organization is
thus equated with a simple bilateral relationship between two
individuals.
Viewing the firm as a unitary and bounded entity, and the
employment relationship as a personal and bilateral contract, distorts
what goes on when workers are employed. Freedland identifies four
functions that make up the idea of employing workers or being an
employer, and he complicates the analysis by demonstrating that the
different functions related to employing labour "may be exercised
together by or within a single employing entity, or they may be exercised
separately by different employing entities.
'
"
33
However, despite the weak conceptual and empirical foundation
for the unitary notion of the employer, it continues to exercise a
profound influence, largely for ideological reasons,34 over how
responsibility for employment-related obligations is ascribed. This
presents a problem from two perspectives: one which looks at the
internal structures or hierarchies within a single employing enterprise,
and one which looks at the relationship between multiple entities
engaged in a common enterprise.
Davies and Freedland recently have focused on the internal
dimension of a single organization, and they make the obvious-
although often ignored-point that organizations can only manage
labour by employing managers. In most cases, there is no such thing as
"the employer"; rather, in most enterprises, a number of people exercise
managerial functions. Thus, many people in an enterprise have dual
functions, as workers and as employers, who manage others. Even chief
executives at the apex of an organization are characterized as
employees, although it is clear that they are not in any way subordinate
3 2Freedland, supra note 20 at 37.
-- These functions are: (1) engaging workers and terminating employment; (2)
remunerating and providing them with other benefits; (3) managing the employment relationship
and the process of work; and (4) using workers' services in the process of production or service
provision. Ibid. at 40.
Davies & Freedland, supra note 7 at 276.
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to an employer. The abstract legal category of the employer, inevitably,
is embodied within human beings.
Moreover, with the increased emphasis on the entrepreneurial
nature of employment, a great many people in employing enterprises
are in an intermediate position between the traditional parties to the
employment relation-the employer and the employee. Thus, Davies
and Freedland argue that, even within a single employing enterprise,
employment relations are multilateral rather than simply bilateral. The
consequences of this analysis on the scope of employment protection
are profound, and Davies and Freedland deserve to be quoted at length
on this point. According to them, there is
a level of employment relations within the enterprise which cannot satisfactorily be
characterised in terms of simple subordination and dependency. This thereby erodes, at a
deep and subtle level, not just the simple bipolar antithesis between 'the employer' and
'the worker', but also, and no less momentously, the simple binary distinction between
employees and independent contractors. All of this tends to de-legitimate the use of that
distinction as a basis for drawing the boundaries of employment rights.
35
Furthermore, from the external perspective, which focuses on
multiple entities engaged in a common enterprise, the conventional
legal approach is problematic.36 This is because the legal starting point
for attributing employment-related responsibility is to search for a
contract with the employer as the basis for ascribing employment-
related obligations. Only the employer with whom the employee has a
contract is liable for employment-related obligations and risks. The legal
conception of the employment relationship as a personal and bilateral
contract allows (and, perhaps, invites) firms to shift the risks associated
with employing labour.
In sum, the fragmentation of work and the changing form of
organizations have revealed the problem at the heart of determining the
scope of employment: conceptualizing employment as a bilateral
contract between two unitary entities that is marked by subordination of
one of the parties to the other. At the same time as the notion of legal
subordination, understood as having to follow the order of a superior, is
giving way in the labour context to the setting of targets that workers
themselves determine how to achieve, in the commercial context, "legal
3 Ibid. at 283.
3 6Fudge, "The Legal Boundaries," in Davidov & Langille, supra note 7.
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independence is being weakened to make business subject to the
collective disciplines of production or distribution networks."37
IV. BEYOND THE EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT
A. The Goals of Regulating Work Arrangements
What is lacking is a conceptual and legal structure that would
capture the wide range of work arrangements that result from the
related processes of fragmenting work and changing organizations.
However, before evaluating different approaches and developing
specific techniques, it is first necessary to consider the justifications for
regulating employment, as the justifications offered will influence both
the approach to, and the techniques of, regulation. Instead of canvassing
the wide range of justifications offered for employment regulation, I will
focus on two broad approaches to regulation. Hugh Collins and Alan
Hyde, who focus on market failure as the primary reason for regulating
employment or work arrangements, provide the first. Tony Prosser's
pluralistic account of regulation provides the second, which rejects
market failure as the threshold reason for employing techniques other
than the private law of property, contract, and tort to regulate social and
economic fields. Although these approaches differ in their starting
points, the extent to which they overlap is significant. This is because
Collins and Hyde share a robust view of what constitutes a labour
market failure, and, thus, their approach tends to justify a great deal of
regulation that has traditionally been justified on distributive grounds.
Similarly, Prosser's rationale for regulation, which emphasizes solidarity
as a legitimate and important goal, also has important implications for
making markets more efficient. However, despite the fact that the two
approaches converge in justifying a wide range of regulation, the
difference in establishing the threshold goals is important both for the
content and the form of regulation.
Situating his analysis within regulation theory, Collins identifies
two general sorts of reasons or justifications that typically are offered for
regulating employment relations: efficiency concerns pertaining to
-z Alain Supiot, "Introductory Remarks: Between Market and Regulation: New Social
Regulation for Life Long Security" in Auer & Gazier, supra note 27, 149 at 153 [Supiot,
"Introductory Remarks"].
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market failure, and welfare concerns relating to distribution.38 Collins
argues that distributive justifications have not had much influence in
regulation theory, either because they are conceptually ill-conceived or
because they create a range of problems that do more harm than good.
Although he does not explicitly refer to regulation theory, Hyde offers
"a revised definition of labour and employment law that locates its
distinctiveness in its techniques for overcoming collective action
problems that will produce sub-optimum contracts in markets that do
not permit the formation of organisations and other similar collective
devices."39 This approach to regulation regards market allocation (that
is, the private law rules of contract, property, and tort) as the preferred
mechanism for regulation unless a market failure can be established.
Bo th Collins and Hyde identify a range of failures that
characterize the labour market and, therefore, justify regulating
employment or, even more broadly in Hyde's case, personal work
arrangements: (1) information asymmetry; (2) inelasticity in labour
supply; (3) collective action problems; (4) overcoming low trust,
opportunism, and sub-optimum investment in human capital; (5) high
transaction costs; and (6) externalities.40 Regulation that addresses these
market failures and promotes efficiency includes laws permitting
workers to form organizations and bargain as a group, the creation of
consultative institutions, minimum terms of employment (such as
minimum wage), restrictions on child labour, ground rules for collective
conflict, default terms for employment contracts (such as minimum
notice provisions and implied duties), health and safety rules, and notice
requirements in the case of economic dismissals.41
38 Hugh Collins, "Justifications and Techniques of Legal Regulation of the Employment
Relation" in Hugh Collins, Paul Davies & Roger Rideout, eds., Legal Regulation of the
Employment Relation (London: Kluwer International, 2000) 3 [Collins, "Justifications and
Techniques"]. Collins has also discussed another basis for regulating employment. See Hugh
Collins, "Regulating the Employment Relation for Competitiveness" (2001) 30 Indus. L.J. 17.
'
9Alan Hyde, "What is Labour Law?" in Davidov & Langille, supra note 7, 37 at 38 [Hyde,
"What is Labour Law?"].
4 Ibid. at 54-57; Collins, "Justifications and Techniques," supra note 38 at 7-11. Collins
characterizes externalities as a distributive issue because they are not directly related to market
failures and result from the fact that private property rights do not consider all relevant interests
during trading. However, externalities could also be seen as an instance of market failure.
" For Collins, based in the United Kingdom, tort law governs collective bargaining,
whereas for Hyde, the National LabourRelationsAct governs industrial conflict.
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Collins and Hyde also agree that inequality of bargaining power
does not provide a distinctive or persuasive justification for regulating
employment because it is conceptually vague and empirically under-
inclusive. However, Hyde claims that the inelasticity of labour supply
does capture what is distinctive of personal service arrangements: the
fact that labour cannot be stored (most workers must sell their labour
power in order to survive) and the fact that workers do not control the
supply of labour.4" Not only does this distinctive characteristic provide
for a wide range of different types of regulation in order to remedy
market failure, it captures a much broader range of work arrangements
than employment contracts.
Is there room for values that cannot be translated into market
enhancing or welfare economics goals in the market failure justification
for employment regulation? According to Collins and Hyde, the
problem with goals such as distributive justice is that they are politically
contentious; employers will likely resist their imposition, and
governments have limited scope for imposing values and goals that
people do not accept. Collins allows for a significant degree of overlap
in the different justifications for regulation, and he points out the
important example of the distribution of power in employment contracts
in which the presence of "excessive or unconstrained managerial
discretion in employment contracts can be challenged on both
distributive and market failure grounds."43 However, Collins notes that
the different, albeit overlapping, justifications might lead to significant
differences in the design of the regulation. Hyde accepts that some
labour law norms, especially those relating to health and safety, should
be understood as basic human rights, which, in effect, trump market
efficiency concerns.
By contrast, Prosser wants to move away from the premise that
the market is the best technique of regulation, and that those advocating
regulation for reasons other than market failure bear the burden of
justification. He suggests that there are additional rationales that justify
42 Some economists argue that market failure is a defining feature of labour markets since
human beings are not produced for the labour market and they conclude that the neo-classical
model is fundamentally flawed as a model for explaining the labour market. See e.g. Antonella
Picchio, Social Reproduction The Political Economy of the Labour Market (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1992).
3 Collins, "Justifications and Techniques," supra note 38 at 16.
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regulation, and he develops the idea of social solidarity as one such
justification. Prosser argues that "regulation must be based upon a
variety of different values which are appropriate to the context in
question, and that there is no overarching first choice logic that can
form the basis for regulatory decisions."'  Prosser emphasizes the
necessity of weighing competing values, and claims that this should be
done through a democratic deliberative process, rather than simply by
fiat of the commitment to welfare economics.
Prosser identifies two roles for regulation based on social
solidarity, which would include a range of social and economic rights.45
The first is that regulation provides the essential social underpinnings of
mutual trust and expectations that are necessary for markets to function.
This approach reverses the assumptions underlying the critique of
regulation. Rather than seeing it as an external constraint on markets,
regulation is a necessary source for those conditions that markets
require for their operation." The second role of regulation for social
solidarity is to prevent the socially fragmenting effect of markets. This is
an important corrective to the market failure approach because it does
not relegate regulation to a second best that is called into play when
markets fail.
Notably absent from Collins and Hyde's list of labour
regulation's objectives is a prohibition against race and sex
discrimination. Although it is possible to justify legislation prohibiting
discrimination against women in employment as market enhancing,47 the
very translation of a human rights approach into a market failure
approach for regulation should raise suspicions that the market failure
approach is neither as technical nor as neutral as its advocates suggest.
4 Tony Prosser, "Regulation and Social Solidarity" (2006) 33 J.L. & Soc'y 364 at 385. The
default preference for market regulation, according to Prosser, is based on the mistaken conception
of other social goals as essentially arbitrary. Here he contrasts "thin" proceduralism, which is
characterized by the exogenous formation of preferences, which are then aggregated through the
electoral system, with "thick" proceduralism, which is based on deliberative democracy. Thick
proceduralism would allow for ethical and moral discourse and debate, and not only technical
discussions concerned with meeting efficiency goals.
45 Ibid. at 382.
46 For a similar analysis of social rights as market creating and perfecting, see Deakin &
Wilkinson, supra note 26 at 290-303.
47 See Simon Deakin's commentary on Richard Epstein in Richard Epstein, Equal
Opportunity or More Opportunities? The Good Thing About Discrimination (London: Institute
for the Study of Civil Society, 2002).
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Labour regulation protecting and promoting freedom of association and
collective bargaining can be justified in terms of protecting human
rights, promoting social solidarity, and remedying market failure. It has
also been criticized, and successfully so in the wake of the political
triumph of neo-liberalism and the dominance of neo-classical economics
in the mid-1980s, as contributing to market failure.48 Subordinating
regulation designed to achieve other social values to the threshold of
market failure is risky in the context of the market for human labour.
Remedying market failure and promoting efficiency is an important goal
in regulating employment and work arrangements. It is also important
to be aware of, and to pay attention to, the host of negative
consequences that regulation can provoke. But market failure should
not become either the exclusive or primary reason for regulating work
arrangements. Human rights and social solidarity are also important
goals that labour regulation should protect and promote.
Moreover, the market failure approach to regulation assumes
that changing employment relations and organizational forms are the
result of the rational pursuit of more efficient and/or effective
organizations. However, in their case studies of organizational and
employment change, Grimshaw et a]. found "substantial evidence of
fragmentation as an outcome of complex, institutionally anchored,
political processes of negotiation over the form of organizations and
employment relationships."49 They also found that power, understood
both collectively and individually as the command of greater resources
and access to more options, influenced the distribution of risk. Their
case studies highlight the centrality of power relations in the
establishment and operation of inter-organizational linkages both at the
level of firms, and between firms and workers.
From the perspective of developing regulatory approaches for
fragmented work and organizations, one of Grimshaw et al.'s most
important findings is that "[p]ressures towards fragmentation and the
shifting of risk have concentrated powers away from centralized
locations where there are opportunities to establish effective institutions
of countervailing power."5 If countervailing power is to be
48 Ibid.
4' Damian Grimshaw et al., "Conclusion: Redrawing Boundaries, Reflecting on Practice
and Policy" in Marchington etal., supra note 9 at 261 [Grimshaw et al., "Conclusion"].
50 Ibid. at 273 [footnote omitted].
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reinstitutionalized, it is necessary to redraw the legal boundaries of
employment and labour regulation.
B. Approaches to Regulating Work Arrangements
1. The Supply Side
There are two general approaches to the problem of
determining the scope of employment on the supply side. The first
approach is represented by the recommendation adopted by the
International Labour Organization (ILO)5 in 2006 and a series of
articles by Guy Davidov. The ILO's solution is to develop better criteria
for dealing with disguised and ambiguous employment relationships.
Davidov goes a bit further: in addition to advocating a purposive
approach to determining the scope of employment,52 he advocates
extending labour protection to dependent workers.53 He also addresses
the problem of triangular employment relationships,54 an issue that was
raised by the ILO, and then ultimately dropped at the 2006 conference. 5
However, like that of the ILO, Davidov's approach is essentially
sl International Labour Conference, Fifth Item on the Agenda: The Employment
Relationship, Provisional Record, 95th Session, Geneva, 2006, Recommendation 198 [International
Labour Conference]. A recent report by the Federal Labour Standards Review goes further than
ILO Recommendation 198 by proposing to extend labour standards to some autonomous workers
and requiring employers to give all workers written notification of their employment. The failure to
provide such notification would result in the worker being categorized as an employee. In addition
to calling for further study of temporary employment agencies, the Commission recommended that
federally regulated firms that used employees.supplied by a temporary agency should be jointly and
severally liable for the payment of wages and benefits. Federal Labour Standards Review, Fairness
at Work. Federal Labour Standards for the 21st Century (Gatineau: Human Resources and Skills
Development Canada, 2006) c. 4, 10.
2 Guy Davidov, "The Three Axes of Employment Relationships: A Characterization of
Workers in Need of Protection" (2002) 52 U.T.L.J. 357.
'Guy Davidov, "Who is. a Worker?" (2005) 34 Indus. L.J. 57.
-4 Guy Davidov, "Joint Employer Status in Triangular Employment Relationships" (2004)
42 Brit. J. Ind. Rel. 727.
' For a brief discussion of the history of this recommendation see Judy Fudge, "Self-
Employment, Women, and Precarious Work: The Scope of Labour Protection" in Fudge & Owens,
eds., supra note 18, 201 at 204-09. For an 'insider's perspective, see Enrique Marin, "The
Employment Relationship: The Issue at the International Level" in Davidov & Langille, supra note
7, 339 at 340. In the conference report on the proposed recommendation, it is clear that the
employers' group adamantly opposed any extension to the scope of employment. See International
Labour Conference, supra note 51.
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rehabilitative. He accepts the characterization of employment as a
personal and bilateral relationship, defends the continuing conceptual
and normative salience of the contract of employment as determining
the scope of labour protection, attempts to shore up the boundary
between dependent labour and independent contracting to determine
the scope of employment protection, and seeks to determine the "real"
employer in triangular relationships. The other approach, advocated by
Freedland56 and Hyde,57 among others, involves a radical rethinking of a
status quo that anchors labour protection to the existence of a personal
and bilateral contract.
The rehabilitative approach adopted by the ILO is
understandable given the nature of its objectives, which was to achieve
tripartite agreement on a specific recommendation. While there are
pragmatic reasons for this approach,58 it does not deal with the deeply
rooted conceptual and normative limitations presented by
characterizing employment as a personal and bilateral contract that is
distinguished from other contracts for the performance of work by some
special vulnerability of employees. Thus, it is ill-equipped to deal with
the larger problem of fragmenting organizations and work.
Davidov offers the most sophisticated attempt to provide a
conceptual and normative justification of the rehabilitative approach.
He conceptualizes employment along three axes in order to characterize
workers in need of protection. Despite the new vocabulary that he uses
to identify the three dimensions of what makes employees especially
vulnerable and thus deserving of employment and labour protection
(democratic deficits and psychological and economic dependence),
these dimensions correspond to the old tests (control, integration, and
business reality, respectively) that have been used by the courts to
determine employee status.59 These dimensions also suffer from the
56 Mark Freedland, "From the Contract of Employment to the Personal Work Nexus"
(2006) 35 Indus. L.J. 1.
57 Hyde, "What is Labour Law?" in Davidov & Langille, supra note 7.
58 Paul Benjamin, "Beyond the Boundaries: Prospects for Expanding Labour Market
Protection in South Africa" in Davidov & Langille, supra note 7, 181 at 190.
s Although Davidov claims that democratic deficits is a better characterization of
employment than subordination (supra note 52 at 377-88) he goes on to claim that control is the
concept central to understanding the organizational aspect of employment relationships (ibid. at
381). In a later essay, he translates inequality of bargaining power into labour market failures: Guy
Davidov, "The Reports of My Death are Greatly Exaggerated: 'Employee' as a Viable (Though
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same problems as the old tests: a lack of precision that is conceptual, as
well as operational, in nature. Inequality of bargaining power, which
Davidov interprets as a market failure and translates into the
terminology of democratic deficits and psychological and economic
dependence,6' simply does not have the conceptual muscle to distinguish
employment from a range of other personal work arrangements that he
argues ought to be excluded from the scope of labour protection.61 He
asserts, rather than demonstrates, that independent contractors are
capable of achieving contracts. with employers (now clients) that are
socially acceptable and able to self-insure against risks, and assumes that
employees are not.62 The fundamental problem with Davidov's analysis
is that he reifies the notion of a bilateral contract for personal service
distinguished by subordination as the justification for employment and
labour protection. Rather than engaging in a serious scrutiny of the
notion, he uses it as the prototype against which to assess competing
claims.
This approach explains the modesty of Davidov's proposals, but
it is his anxiety that extending the scope of labour law beyond
employment will have unacceptable consequences that explains his
commitment to a view of employment as a personal and bilateral
Over-used) Legal Concept" in Davidov & Langille, supra note 7, 133 at 138-43 [Davidov, "Reports
of My Death"].
o Davidov, "Reports of My Death," ibid. at 138. Davidov does not address Hyde's.
argument that labour market failures should expand the scope of labour protection beyond
employment or Hyde's point that the problem of using proxies such as subordination or economic
dependency to identify market failure is that, more often than not, they will simply be used to
reinforce old judicial practices. See Hyde, "What is Labour Law?" in Davidov & Langille, supra
note 7, 37 at 60, n. 45.
6) A large range of commercial transactions, such as franchising arrangements and
networks involving a range of commercial entities, are also characterized by democratic deficits,
and some employment relationships, especially those of high-ranking corporate executives,
entrepreneurial knowledge workers, and law professors are not characterized by such deficits. See
the work cited at supra note 16 for examples of employment relationships that are not
characterized by democratic deficits.
62 Supra note 52 at 359. For those who are familiar with the common law of employment,
the paradox is that employees who are least in need of legal protection (high-ranking managers and
executives) enjoy the most protection, and employees who are most in need of it (cleaners and
catering staff), receive the least protection. For a similar observation, see Mark Freedland,
"Rethinking the Personal Work Contract" (2005) 58 Curr. Legal Probs. 517 at 537, and Alain
Supiot, Beyond Employment: Changes in Work and the Future of Labour Law in Europe (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2001) at 13.
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contract.63 According to Davidov, replacing employment with contracts
for the performance of work will mean
either that general contract law will be applied to employment contracts, or that
independent contractors who sell their labour power to numerous clients (e.g. plumbers)
will be treated like the employees of each of their clients. Both options are clearly
unacceptable. As long as there is some difference, in real life, between employees and
independent contractors - a difference with significance for the purpose of providing
workers' protection - this difference must be recognized in legal regulation or employees
will end up losing their basic rights. 6'
Davidov identifies two salient differences. The first is that,
unlike independent contractors, employees cannot protect themselves in
the market. The second is that, unlike independent contractors,
employees have an employer "who can and should take care of their
well-being."65 However, as the preceding discussion demonstrates, these
differences do not correspond to the "reality" of a growing number of
work arrangements in which self-employed workers are extremely
vulnerable and many employees cannot find a corresponding employer.
Davidov is prepared to accept both conceptual incoherence and the fact
that, according to his own criteria, employment is under- and over-
inclusive as a mechanism for protecting vulnerable workers' in order to
maintain the legitimacy of labour law as a regulatory mechanism that is
distinct from commercial law. Moreover, because he is wedded to the
prototype of employment as a personal and bilateral contract, he cannot
deal with the demand side of the problem of the scope of employment-
that is, multiple entities engaged in a common enterprise. In the case of
temporary agency work, his solution to the problem of the triangular
nature of the relationship is to identify the employer who exercises
control over the agency worker. Only when that endeavour fails (as it
inevitably will in the case of truly temporary placements) does he
recommend making the agency and the client firm jointly responsible
for employment-related obligations.66
'See also Freedland, supra note 56 at 28-29.
4 Davidov, "Reports of My Death," in Davidov & Langille, supra note 7, 133 at 147.
65 Ibid.
6
,
6 The problem with Davidov's analysis of temporary agency work is that he focuses only on
the relations between the employing firms and the workers as a basis for ascribing liability rather
than on the relationship between the firms that are engaged in a common enterprise and how the
inter-firm relationships influence the attribution of employment-related obligations. His narrow
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The legitimacy of regulating work arrangements using the values
and techniques traditionally associated with labour law is very
important, and I will address this issue in the conclusion. At this point,
however, it is important to note that several scholars (myself included)
have argued for the need both to move away from conceptualizing
employment as a personal bilateral contract characterized by
subordination and to expand the scope of labour protection beyond
employment. Hyde develops the idea that labour law Should respond to
collective action problems that create labour market failures. The
question of whether particular groups of workers should obtain such
legally recognized collective bargaining rights would depend upon
whether or not it is in the public interest.67
Freedland has also jettisoned the contract of employment as the
conceptual core of labour law, adopting in its stead the wider, and more
diverse, notion of personal work contracts. They can be analyzed across
five dimensions: (1) the workers; (2) the employing enterprise; (3)
duration and continuity; (4) personality; and (5) purpose or motivation.
The prevailing conception locates the contract of employment at the
centre of an expanding ring of concentric circles of personal service
contracts that stop at independent contractors. By contrast, Freedland's
conception of the domain of personal work contracts is an openly
constructed sphere with a permeable outer boundary enclosing personal
work contracts, which move freely through the sphere along the five
focus on the relationship between the firm and the employee is attributable to his attempt to
analogize work arrangements to a personal and bilateral relationship that is marked by the
employer's control over an employee. Moreover, Davidov's claims (supra note 54 at 734) about the
status of temporary agency workers under employment standards legislation and the interpretation
of the related employer provisions under that legislation are do not reflect the situation in Ontario,
the most populous jurisdiction. in Canada. Even workers who have been placed with a client firm for
several years are considered to be the employees of the agency, and under the Ontario Employment
Standards Act adjudicators continue to insist on control in terms of ownership as a relevant factor
in finding distinct entities to be related employers For a discussion of the difference in the
definition and interpretation of the related employer provisions in collective bargaining and
employment standards legislation in Ontario, see Judy Fudge & Kate Zavitz, "Vertical
Disintegration and Related Employers: Attributing Employment-Related Obligations in Ontario"
13 C.L.E.L.J. [forthcoming].
67 Hyde, "What is Labour Law?" in Davidov & Langille, sopra note 7, 37 at 60. See also
Cranford et al., supra note 29 for a similar recommendation and a discussion of different ways of
providing collective bargaining rights for self-employed workers.
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dimensions.68 Moreover, he offers the idea of "the personal work
nexus," which is intended to deal with non-contractuality, complexity, or
multilateralism, and the presence of incidental arrangements that
cannot be captured within the personal work contract, in order to
provide "an even larger explanatory matrix for the legal construction of
those personal work relationships.,
69
Freedland's conception of a personal nexus holds a great deal of
promise for analyzing complex organizations and fragmenting
employment. The five dimensions of personal work contracts that he
identifies have the potential to provide a basis for determining the scope
of different elements of labour law, such as hours of work rules or
health and safety standards and rights, in relation to different types of
work arrangements. Moreover, his conception of a personal work nexus
provides the opportunity to develop a more comprehensive basis for
attributing employment-related obligations to multilateral employing
enterprises.7"
2. The Demand Side
There is a lack of fit between the traditional binary and personal
conception of the employment contract in which the employer is
conceived of as a unitary entity, and the range of complex ways labour is
employed in enterprises that are often composed of several entities.
More importantly, the insistence on privity and separate legal corporate
personality as a basis for liability creates a number of normative and
distributive problems. Although employees have little say about how
enterprises are organized and employment relations are structured and,
thus, little input into how risks are distributed amongst entities engaged
68 For an approach that favours concentric and weakening circles of labour protection
radiating away from the contract of employment, which is distinguished by subordination, see
Supiot, supra note 62 at 55.
69 Supra note 56 at 17.
o Together with Eric Tucker and Leah Vosko, I advocated that, in principle, labour law
should be extended to all workers who sell their capacity to work. We argued that the onus should
be on those seeking to exclude workers from labour protection, and that this onus could be met by
identifying features of either the work arrangement or the specific regulation that warrant the
exclusion. Our recommendations are similar to Freedland's in that they are based on a multi-
dimensional approach to identifying work arrangements, are sensitive to different fields of labour
law, and recognized the importance of the demand side in determining the scope of labour
protection. Fudge, Tucker & Vosko, The Legal Concept, supra note 22.
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in a common enterprise, they bear the consequences of how those risks
are distributed. Grimshaw et al. note that in the United Kingdom, "[b]y
default, if not by design, the legal and policy framework often ...
prevents ready identification of agents who are responsible, and thus
frustrates the process of bringing them to account."'" As I have detailed
elsewhere, in Canada the current legal basis for ascribing employment-
related obligations operates as an incentive to firms to externalize their
responsibility for employing labour.72 For these reasons, there is a need
to go beyond contract and the corporate form, and adopt a relational
and functional approach to ascribing employment-related
responsibilities in situations involving multilateral work arrangements in
employing enterprises.
Much of the conceptual difficulty in ascribing responsibility for
obligations related to employing labour in complex, multilateral
organizations can be dissipated by separating out three dimensions of
the problem. First, the legal concept of "employer" serves different
functions in labour law. Second, enterprises that employ labour can be
made up of a wide variety of different types of arrangements with
different degrees of autonomy and control. Third, there are different
subfields, with different goals, within the broad area of labour law. It is
useful to elaborate on each of these dimensions in turn and then to
describe how they interrelate.
Deakin has developed a functional approach to identifying the
employer in order to establish a unifying set of underlying principles
that can lend coherence to the task of attaching the liabilities relating to
employing labour to a particular entity or group of entities.73 The
different functions serve as criteria for identifying which entity or
entities should bear employment-related responsibilities. The first
function is that of managing or coordinating the productive process.
According to Deakin, "on this basis, the scope of employer liability
would be determined by reference to the presence of managerial
control" and this is what the "control" or "subordination" test of
employee status seeks to identify.74 The employer also functions,
7' Grimshaw et al., "Conclusion" in Marchington et al., supra note 9 at 273.
72 Fudge, "The Legal Boundaries" in Davidov & Langille, supra note 7.
' Simon Deakin, "The Changing Concept of 'Employer' in Labour Law" (2001) 30 Indust.
L.J. 72 at 79.
74 Ibid.
[VOL. 44, NO. 4
Fragmenting Work
through the taxation and social insurance systems, as a mechanism for
absorbing and spreading certain economic and social risks, such as those
of unemployment, interruption of income, and work-related injury or
disease. The "integration" and "economic reality" tests are used to
determine the scope of employment protection for these purposes. The
employer's third function is to serve as a space within which the
principle of equal treatment or comparative fairness must be observed.
The benefit of this functional approach to identify the employer
is that it takes us beyond a simple contractual approach to ascribing
employment-related obligations and recognizes that the employer
cannot simply be reduced to the corporation with which the employee
has a contract. There are several examples of the law recognizing a
broader basis for ascribing employment-related obligations than a
simple bilateral contract. These include the concept of related,
associated, and common employers in the common law and employment
statutes, which preserves an employee's status and employment
continuity through the sale of a business, as well as the idea of
enterprise risk, which is used as the basis for delineating the scope of
vicarious liability.75 The common feature of the legal devices that
broaden the scope of employment-related obligations beyond the
personal and bilateral contract is that they use the idea of enterprise as
the basis for ascribing responsibility.
Deakin equivocates in using the term "employer" and the term
''enterprise" to identify the different functions that the concept
"employer" serves in labour law.76 The reason for this slippage is the
historical congruence between the "employer" and the "enterprise" in
the post-World War II period, when the large vertically integrated firm
was the hegemonic form of organizing production and services and the
basis for standardizing the employment relationship and delivering
employment protection and social insurance.77 But, as Deakin notes,
while these two terms may be congruent-and they were in fact
congruent when enterprise took the organizational form of the vertically
s Fudge, "The Legal Boundaries" in Davidov & Langille, supra note 7; Fudge & Zavitz,
supra note 66; and Simon Deakin, "'Enterprise Risk': The Juridical Nature of the Firm Revisited"
(2003) 32 Indust. L.J. 97.
6Deakin, supra note 73 at 72.
' Guylaine Vall6e, "What is Corporate Social Responsibility?: The Case of Canada"
(2005) 47 Managerial Law 20.
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integrated firm-they are not equivalent: "The legal meaning of the
employer is not synonymous with the sociological or economic idea of
the 'enterprise' or 'organization', nor with the workplace, that is, the
physical site on which work is carried out."78 The enterprise is an
economic unity that brings together physical, technical, and human
resources oriented towards the achievement of a productive goal,
whether the production of goods or services.79
The problem with using the term employer to capture the idea
of the enterprise is that the organizational unity of the firm, which was
the basis for identifying the employer as an entity with the enterprise as
an activity, has broken down. Although the three functions were united
within the large vertically integrated firms that prevailed from 1945 to
the early 1980s, there was (and is) no necessary unity between the
coordination, risk absorption, and equity functions of an enterprise as
an activity and the organizational form that an enterprise takes."0
Grimshaw et al. demonstrate that the activities of an enterprise can be
coordinated and integrated in a variety of firms through an amalgam of
market, hierarchy, and network. The coordination and management of
labour can be diversified across several different firms engaged in a
common enterprise, and the risks associated with employing labour can
be shifted from one firm to another with important consequences for
the workers who are employed in the enterprise. Labour law needs to
develop techniques to deal with controlled autonomy as well as the
transfer of risk that occurs once the enterprise as an activity loses its
organizational unity.8 By conceptualizing the enterprise as an activity
rather than an organization, it is possible to capture enterprises that are
organized via hierarchy, market, and network.
The second dimension that is important in ascribing
responsibility for employment-related obligations is the type of
arrangement that is used by an enterprise to employ labour. Both the
78Deakin, supra note 73 at 73.
7 9Vallke, supra note 77; Deakin, supra note 75 at 98.
8 0 Vall6e makes this important distinction (supra note 77), and Freedland (supra note 62 at
541-42) also refers to it. In Quebec, the Labour Court initially interpreted the successor rights
legislation as covering the enterprise as an activity. See Fudge, "The Legal Boundaries" in Davidov
& Langille, supra note 7, 295 at 309.
' Marie-Laure Morin, "Labour Law and New Forms of Corporate Organization" (2005)
144 Int'l Lab. Rev. 5.
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relationship between the firms engaged in an enterprise and between
the firms and the workers whose labour they employ are features of this
dimension. These arrangements can be classified into three different
types of situations. Focusing on the managerial or coordinating function,
Davies and Freedland identify two situations. 2 There is also a third
situation, one in which the risk-absorption function of the enterprise is
paramount.
8 3
The first situation arises when separate legal entities comprise a
coherent managerial unit under common control, which is
conventionally understood as ownership. The paradigmatic example is
the corporate group, which in labour law is known as associated and
related employers. The second is where managerial power has been
diversified across two or more legal units that are clearly not under
common ownership and control. Typical examples include the use of
temporary agency workers and labour-only contracting, as well as some
franchising situations. Some forms of network organizations and joint
ventures also fall into this category. There is also a third category
involving outsourcing situations, such as some instances of franchising
and contracting out, in which there is a high degree of integration
between different entities but where the management of labour is not
distributed between them. In situations involving supply chains, for
example, although the contractors provide a product rather than a
service to the retailer, the contractors are so closely integrated into the
retailer's operation that the retailer effectively sets the terms and
conditions of employment for the contractors' employees by imposing
the constraints within which the contractors must operate. The retailer's
control over resources and the range of available options gives them
great power over contractors and allows them to shift risks on to the
contractors, who in turn shift them on to employees or self-employed
workers.
The final dimension relates to the different reasons for, or goals
of, regulating labour. Labour law can be broken into three broad
subfields corresponding to different goals or values that the regulation
seeks to achieve.' The first subfield pertains to economic governance-
82Davies & Freedland, supra note 1.
s Fudge & Zavitz, supra note 66.
8 Fudge, Tucker & Vosko, The Legal Concept, supra note 22. As we note, some types of
legisiation, such as collective bargaining law, can be characterized as either social justice or
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minimum labour standards and collective bargaining. This general type
of labour regulation serves two purposes: to correct for market failures
and to promote solidarity. The second broad subfield comprises social
justice and includes occupational health and safety and human rights
legislation. Its goal is to promote and protect human rights. Social
insurance and revenue laws, such as workers' compensation,
unemployment insurance, public pensions, and tax, constitute the third
subfield of labour regulation, and the goals of this regulatory subfield
are also to correct for market failure and to promote social solidarity.
The different functions that the concept of employer is designed
to fulfill provide different justifications for ascribing responsibility for
employment-related obligations. There are two principles for ascribing
responsibility for employment-related obligations to an enterprise. The
first is the most commonly accepted, and it has to do with managerial
control and coordination: the entity that exercises control should be
responsible for the risks and liabilities created. The second moves
beyond a fault-based model of responsibility to capture the idea of
enterprise responsibility based on the commitment to risk absorption
and spreading inherent in the concept of social solidarity." The idea is
that enterprises should share the risks inherent in socially useful activity,
and it is based on an analysis of the risks created by the enterprise's
activities.86
The matrix for ascribing employment-related responsibility that
I have described can be depicted schematically as a simple chart. The
cells on the left side contain the dimensions of, and mechanisms for,
ascribing employment-related responsibility, and the cells along the top
refer to the varieties of organizational forms for engaging in enterprises.
The central idea is to base responsibility for employment-related
economic governance. However, we argue that the typology we have provided captures the salient
differences between different types of regulation in relation to the key purposes they are designed
to achieve in the Canadian (and U.S.) context.
sVali~e, supra note 77.
66 As Valike (supra note 77) and Deakin (supra note 75 at 113) point out, the risk
absorption and spreading basis for ascribing responsibility is part of the wider interest in "corporate
social responsibility," which is concerned about the responsibility of enterprises for the social risks
associated with their activities.
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obligations on the enterprise as a coordinated and integrated activity.87
The next step is to identify the different functions that the enterprise
plays within labour law, the different ways that enterprises can be
organized, and the different subfields of labour law. In developing
techniques for regulation, it is important to consider the goals
regulation is designed to achieve and to select techniques that have
resonance within the legal system. Joint and several liability, for
example, is an accepted method in tort law for ascribing responsibility to
separate entities engaged in a common enterprise. Moreover, before the
rise and proliferation of the vertically integrated firm, joint and several
liability was a common labour law technique for ascribing employment-
related responsibilities to organizations involved in a common
enterprise."
87 Freedland, supra note 62, makes reference to the importance of looking to continental
Europe to see how this concept is legally institutionalized and Vall6e, supra note 77, provides a
helpful overview of how this concept is understood in QuEbec.
' G. de N. Clark, "Industrial Law and the Labour-Only Sub-Contract" (1967) 30 Mod. L.
Rev. 6 at 22-24. Eric Tucker recounts the long history-which dates to the mid-1880s-in common
law countries of judges limiting shareholder and director liability for unpaid wages in the face of
remedial legislation. • See Eric Tucker, "Recurring Dilemmas: The History of Shareholder and
Director Liability for Workers Wages in Canada" L.H.R. [forthcoming in 2007]. For a modern
example of the use of joint and several liability to enforce labour standards, see David Weil, "Public
Enforcement / Private Monitoring: Evaluating a New Approach to Regulating the Minimum Wage"
(2005) 58 Indus. & Lab. Rel. Rev. 238.
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Figure 2: Matrix for Attributing Responsibility to Employing Enterprises
Organizational Dispersed Dispersed Management
Form of the Management Management Not Dispersed
Enterprise
Common No Control No Control
Control'
Close Functional
Integration
Basis for Management/ Management/ Risk Absorption
Attributing Co-ordination Co-ordination and Spreading
Responsibility
Risk Absorption Risk Absorption
and Spreading and Spreading
Equity Equity
Method for Joint and Several Joint and Several Joint and Several
Attributing Liability Liability Liability
Responsibility
Contract
compliance
Labour Law Economic Economic Economic
Sub Fields Governance Governance Governance
Social Justice Social Justice Social Justice
Social Insurance Social Insurance Social Insurance
* Control means ownership and/or overlapping directors and/or key personnel
Having identified the matrix of dimensions and principles
involved in ascribing responsibility for employment-related obligations,
it is now possible to evaluate a variety of different approaches that have
been offered. Marie-Laure Morin summarizes three types of approaches
identified by Gunther Teubner and designed to respond to the changing
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form of organizations and fragmented work. 9 The first is to seek out
fraud; the second is to piece together the constituent parts of the
enterprise; and the third is to examine the contractual or financial
relationships between firms in order to retrace the chain of
responsibility. I shall analyze each approach using the matrix that I have
developed for ascribing employment-related responsibilities in
multilateral enterprises.
The first approach is to seek out fraud and identify the real
employer. It continues to conceptualize the employment relationship in
personal and bilateral terms and invokes the concept of control to
determine which among the possible entities is the "real" employer.
However, it is ambiguous as to whether control refers to the control
exercised over the employee or the control exercised by one firm over
another. This approach would apply to triangular relationships involving
labour-only contracting in which the contractor provided labour and no
supervision. It would also apply to cases of shell corporations that are
used to limit the liability of the real employer. But, the problem with this
approach is that it does not appreciate new configurations and transfers
of risk; in the face of new organizational forms the task is not simply one
of * re-conceptualizing the enterprise to come up with a binary
relationship.90 There is a need to move beyond the idea of an employer
exercising control over the employee or over another firm that controls
the employee and to develop a conception of the enterprise that
includes networks and markets.91
The second approach, which is prevalent in France and other
continental European legal systems, is to piece together the constituent
parts of an enterprise to get a picture of its social and economic unity.92
This approach would cover the first two of the three types of
'Gunther Teubner, "Nouvelles formes d'organisation et droit" (1993) 96 Revue frangaise
de gestion 50-68. For a discussion of organizational and social theoretical conceptions of the
enterprise and their relationship to a juridical conception that is grounded in German law, see
Gunther Teubner, "Company Interest: The Public Internet of the Enterprise 'in Itself" in Ralf
Rogowski and Ton Wilthagen, eds., Reflexive Labour Law: Studies in Industrial Relations and
Employment Regulation (Boston: Kluwer Law and Taxation, 1994) 21.
'Morin, supra note 81.
9' Collins, "Multi-segmented Workforces" in Davidov & Langille, supra note 7, 317 at 336;
Davies & Freedland, "Complexities," in Davidov & Langille, supra note 7, 273 at 290; and Supiot,
supra note 62 at 22.
92 Freedland, supra note 62; Hepple, supra note 2 at 65; Morin, supra note 81; Supiot,
supra note 62 at 21-22. Vall6e notes, supra note 77, that this concept is also familiar in Quebec.
2006]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
arrangements identified above in which managerial or coordinating
functions are distributed across separate legal entities. In situations
involving shared management of workers, both justifications for
imposing liability (coordination and risk absorption) for employment-
related obligations on all entities engaged in a common enterprise are
pertinent. The basis for liability would not be contractual, but rather
would be conceived of in terms of tort. Imposing liability on this basis
conforms better with the reality of work arrangements, in which workers
have little opportunity to bargain over the form of the enterprise that
employs them, even though the organizational form that the enterprise
takes will have a dramatic impact upon the risks the employees bear.
The solution would be to impose joint and several liability on all of the
entities engaged in the enterprise in order to ensure the internalization
of responsibilities and prevent the more powerful firms involved in the
enterprise from shifting risk on to other entities that do not have the
capacity to absorb them. The benefit of this approach is that it is simple
and it would provide the workers with recourse against all of the entities
that were engaged in the common activities of the enterprise.
This approach would capture the management and coordination
as well as the risk-absorbing and spreading functions of an enterprise,
and it should be used in all three subfields of labour law. In
arrangements characterized by the distribution of management and
coordination functions, the enterprise should provide the space in which
comparative fairness prevails.93 The technique of imposing joint and
several liability with respect to all of the labour-related obligations
would avoid the complexity of the functional approach suggested by
Deakin, in which a particular entity would be responsible for specific
employment-related obligations.94 He proposes that in a situation
involving labour-only contracting, for example, the user firms would be
responsible for the workers' health and safety, whereas the contractor
would be responsible for wages and social insurance remittances.
However, imposing joint and several liability is much simpler, and
conforms to the principle of spreading the risk throughout the
enterprise. Moreover, the parties engaged in the enterprise are much
better situated to work out which entity should actually pay for the risk
Collins, "Multi-segmented Workforces" in Davidov & Langille, supra note 7.
4 Deakin, supra note 73 at 81-82.
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through indemnification clauses in contracts with each other. This
approach, combined with the technique of joint and several liability, is
designed to address complex multilateral personal work arrangements in
network organizations.
Teubner's third approach to the issue of ascribing employment-
related responsibility is. to examine contractual and financial
relationships in order to trace the chain of responsibility. According to
Morin, the aim here
is neither to crack down on fraud in order to identify the real employer nor to piece
together a full picture of the enterprise, but to take account of inter-firm relationships so
as to determine each firm's respective share of responsibility for such events as may
occur over the course of the employment relationship.
95
This approach would cover the third type of situation, where there is no
common ownership and management functions are not distributed
across the enterprises, but where the firms are functionally integrated in
a common enterprise. It responds to the need to develop regulatory
mechanisms to apply universally across labour or supply chains, and to
provide effective countervailing power to the new configurations of
capital.96 It could also apply, in certain instances, to corporate groups
when the separate corporations are controlled (owned) by one firm but
the management of labour is not diversified across firms.
This approach is justified on the ground that entities should
internalize the risks they create,97 and it is especially compelling in
situations where one or two firms are engaged in a common enterprise
and thus have the power to shift risks to other firms, with the result that
workers are left bearing them. It emphasizes the risk-absorption and
spreading function of the enterprise. The technique of joint and several
liability could be used to operationalize this approach in the context of
economic governance and social insurance. Contract compliance in the
field of social justice could be used as a means for ensuring that firms
that manage labour within the common enterprise are accountable to
other firms in the enterprise that benefits from the labour. However,
since the management function is not distributed amongst the entities in
9 5Morin, supra note 81 at 15.
Rubery, Earnshaw & Marchington, "Blurring the Boundaries" in Marchington et al.,
supra note 9 at 87.
7 This is even more compelling given that they capture the profits.
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the enterprise, the principle of comparative fairness would not apply to
the enterprise.
This matrix, which is based on conceptualizing the enterprise as
an activity instead of identifying it with a particular organizational form,
is an attempt to develop a framework for ascribing employment-related
responsibilities for work arrangements that deviate from the prototype
of a personal and bilateral contract characterized by subordination.
Combined with the proposal to extend labour protection to all personal
work arrangements, it is designed to deal with the "[v]ertical
disaggregation and horizontal meshing [that] characterize the shift in
organizational forms" and the concomitant fragmentation of
employment relationships "as the internalized worker (full time or part
time) is supplemented, if not supplanted, by externalized, temporary,
and self-employed workers."98 The fundamental ideas are that
enterprises, however organized, should be responsible for the risks that
their activities create and that responding to market failures, protecting
human rights, promoting solidarity, and creating countervailing power
provide compelling public policy reasons for regulating work
arrangements.
V. CONCLUSION
Davies and Freedland note that the conceptual crisis in
determining the scope of employment has not reached the level of a
political or social crisis. In an environment dominated by neo-liberal
labour market policies, the resilience of the status quo is not surprising.
The proliferation of network organizations and the increase in self-
employment are celebrated as evidence of the vibrancy of the market
and entrepreneurship. At a time when any form of labour regulation
other than the private law of contract is treated with suspicion, it is
understandable that calls to expand the scope of labour protection
create anxiety. Scholars who treat labour law as a vocation99 fear that
such an extension will either be ineffective at the outer edge or it will
dilute labour law's distinctive normative content."° They need only look
98 Grimshaw et al., "Conclusion" in Marchington et al., supra note 9 at 264.
'Hugh Collins, "Labour Law as a Vocation" (1989) 105 Law Q. Rev. 468.
"o Davidov, supra note 52; Freedland, supra note 63. In a forthcoming article, Mark
Freedland states "that it is entirely legitimate, indeed important, for labour/employment law to
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at the recent events in Australia. to have their fears confirmed. The
Howard government has swept away special state legislation designed to
protect self-employed workers and replaced it with a new
Commonwealth independent contractors bill, the intent of which is to
ensure that labour law stops at the traditional boundary of subordinated
workers.°1
However, the problem with strengthening the boundaries of
labour law in order to preserve it is the resulting exclusion of growing
numbers of workers as organizations and employment continue to
fragment. As the protective scope of labour law narrows, labour law's
legitimacy is threatened. Not only will fewer workers be able to enjoy its
benefits, those that can will be the ones who need it least. There is no
easy way to avoid the question of labour law's legitimacy-it must be
faced head on.
In order to justify the expansion of labour law to personal work
arrangements and to develop new methods of ascribing employment-
related obligations to respond to vertical disintegration, it is necessary to
confront three deeply rooted ideologies that have shaped modern
labour law. The first is that independent contractors are entrepreneurs
who are able to self-insure and who take profits for risk. The empirical
evidence demonstrates that there is no necessary correlation between
forms of employment and the rewards that workers enjoy and the risks
that they bear. Limiting the scope of labour law to employees can only
be understood as the outcome of a historical process that was contingent
and contested, and not as an inevitable feature of a natural legal order.
The second ideology that labour law must confront is that the private
law of contract, property, and tort are the best methods of regulating
every market, including the labour market. Even commercial law is no
longer (if it ever was) a realm of private law unsullied by other forms of
advance boldly into those sectors of the developing employment economy - or, at the very least, not
to allow those sectors to experience a retreat from them in the face of neo-liberal political
pressures." He also advocates exploring an approach that uses the notion of enterprise/activit6 of
French law of ascribing employment-related obligations. See "Developing the European
Comparative Law of Personal Work Contract" Comp. Lab. L. & Pol'y J. [forthcoming in 2007].
101 Joellen Riley, "A Fair Deal for the Entrepreneurial Worker? Self-employment and
Independent Contracting Post Work Choices" (2006) 19 Austl. J. Lab. L. 246. However, as Riley
notes, even the Howard government has been careful to take steps to ensure that independent
contracting is not a form of disguised self-employment and that the most vulnerable self-employed
workers, outworkers (home workers) in the garment industry, continue to have access to some form
of labour protection.
2006]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
regulation; consumer protection and franchise regulations combined
with the common law development of good faith add normative
pluralism to market regulation. The third ideology derives from
company law, "in which the limited liability company is asserted to be
the exact and full equivalent of the human employer."' 2 Separate legal
personality and limited liability for corporations were not emanations
from a natural legal order, but were granted in exchange for the
corporation's willingness to undertake a range of social responsibilities.
In the post-war period of market expansion, the large vertically
integrated firm became a primary platform for socializing the risk
associated with productive activity.
As organizations fragment, the integrative function of the
employer identified with the organization is undermined. Older forms of
market-based organizations are proliferating and newer types of
networks are emerging. The problem is that labour law, which was
conceived for Fordist productive relations,"3 does not yet have the
conceptual tools to deal with the new forms of organization and work
arrangements. In developing these tools, it is important to consider the
goals of labour regulation-responding to market failure, protecting
human rights, and promoting solidarity. Now, once again, this last goal is
extremely important as the current process of market expansion and
fragmentation threatens to undermine the basis for both social solidarity
and countervailing power. Expanding the scope of labour protection to
personal service arrangements and ascribing employment-related
obligations to enterprises is an attempt to revitalize labour law's
distinctive contribution, which is to strengthen the bonds of social
solidarity, to promote countervailing power, and to achieve democratic
accountability in the world of work.
102 Davies & Freedland, supra note 7, 273 at 276.
103 Judy Fudge & Eric Tucker, Labour Before the Law. The Regulation of Workers'
Collective Action in Canada, 1900- 1948 (Don Mills: Oxford University Press, 2001).
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